rationalizable choice model that accommodates cyclic choice behavior, which is common anomaly observed in experiments.
1) The objective of this note is to analyze the gap that exists between standard choice theory and the sequential choice model in Manzini and Mariotti (2007) , which they term the rational shortlist method (RSM) model.
A decision maker (DM) in the RSM framework has two rationales. She departs from the standard theory in the following respects: (i) the DM uses her first rationale to form a shortlist, from which she makes her final choice using the second rationale; (ii.a) the DM's first rationale may be intransitive; and (ii.b) the DM's second rationale may be cyclic.
2) The RSM model encompasses at least two interpretations: a) the first rationale can be interpreted as the DM's (potentially incomplete) underlying strict preference, and the second as the "tie-breaking rule," and b) the first rationale can be interpreted as some selection criterion that the DM deems important; and the second rationale as the DM's underlying preference. Hence, an RSM choice function is observationally equivalent to the standard choice function if the first rationale is a complete strict preference (under interpretation a)), or if the first rationale is empty and the second rationale is a complete strict preference (under interpretation b)). Whichever interpretation is employed, a non-standard preference is permitted in the RSM framework. Therefore, behavioral anomalies that are identified in the RSM framework may be the result of the procedure by which a shortlist is created before the final decision is made, or a non-standard preference, or a combination of the two.
In this note, we employ interpretation b). In our model, which we call a transitive-RSM model, while (i) the DM still forms a shortlist before making the final choice,
(ii.a') her first rationale (her criterion) is transitive, and (ii.b') her second rationale (her preference) is complete and transitive. Therefore, our model departs from the standard choice model only if the DM's criterion is neither empty nor complete. Since a shortlist 1) For example, in the experiment conducted by Loomes et al. (1991) , out of 200 subjects, 128 subjects exhibited some form of cyclic choice. Also see Tversky (1972) and Starmer and Sugden (1998) .
2) In general, there are multiple pairs of rationales that sequentially rationalize an RSM choice function.
However, some RSM choice functions can be sequentially rationalized only by a cyclic second rationale.
is formed if and only if the criterion is nonempty, any behavioral anomalies in our model must result from the presumption that the DM forms a shortlist.
Conditions (ii.a') and (ii.b') are imposed in order to keep the departure of our model from the standard theory minimal. We find these are reasonable assumptions. The reason for imposing condition (ii.a') is the following. Transitivity of the criterion requires that if y beats x, then x can never matter to any set containing y. In other words, the shortlists from S and S\ {x} have to be identical whenever an alternative x is not in the shortlist from a choice set S (that contains x and y). Condition (ii.b') is equivalent to requiring that the underlying preference is a standard (strict) preference.
3)
Our representation theorem (Theorem 1) shows that an RSM model is behaviorally different from a transitive-RSM model if and only if one axiom, which we call the axiom of No Binary Chain Cycles (NBCC), is violated. Our second result (Theorem 2) identifies the set of criterion-preference pairs that rationalize a given choice function. We then identify the condition on the choice function under which the criterion-preference representation is unique (Corollary 1).
Our note is closely related to Cherepanov et al. (2008) . Like our note, the DM in their paper forms a shortlist, and then makes a choice according to a standard preference over alternatives. Unlike our note, however, the DM has multiple criteria, and the shortlist consists of all alternatives that are maximal with respect to at least one of the criteria.
They introduce an axiom which imposes acyclicity on the revealed preference, and then
show that the axiom completely characterizes choice behavior that arises from their model. The notion of the revealed preference in their paper is similar to but independent from ours. As a result, their axiom is neither weaker nor stronger than our NBCC axiom.
Nevertheless, it can be easily verified that their axiom is implied by our NBCC axiom and the Weak WARP introduced in Manzini and Mariotti (2007) .
3) Another reason for studying a restrictive sequential choice model is that if we do not get a unique representation, or comparative static result in this most restrictive class, we never get them in a more general model.
Other related papers include Aspesteguia and Ballester (2009), García-Sanz and Alcantud (2010) , and Manzini and Mariotti (2010) . In contrast to our note, all these works generalize the original model in Manzini and Mariotti (2007) . Aspesteguia and Ballester (2009) consider a sequential choice model with acyclic rationales. They axiomatize the choice behavior of a DM who employs a sequence of incomplete and acyclic rationales to eliminate alternatives from the choice set until she reaches a unique element, which is her final choice. Their axiom is about the existence of a binary selector (a function that selects a binary choice problem from an arbitrary choice problem) that satisfies a consistency requirement. In contrast, our set of axioms is directly imposed on the choice function, and therefore is easily comparable with axioms in other papers. 
Basic Definitions
Consider an arbitrary non-empty finite set X with |X| ≥ 3. The set of choice problems is
for all S ∈ Ω X . The decision maker (DM) has an asymmetric, complete, and transitive (strong) preference relation P 2 ∈ X × X. We denote the P 2 -maximum element of S by c 2 (S; P 2 ). A criterion is an asymmetric and transitive binary relation, P 1 ⊂ X × X. We call the set of P 1 -maximal elements of S, max (S; P 1 ) ≡ x ∈ S : y s.th. yP 1 x , the shortlist 4) A semiorder is a transitive binary relation. See Luce (1956) for the definition.
from S. For notational convenience, we denote c 2 (max (S; P 1 ) ; P 2 ) by c (P 1 ,P 2 ) (S).
Definition 1 A choice function c is a transitive rational shortlist method (transitive-RSM)
if there exists a pair of criterion and preference (P 1 , P 2 ) such that c (S) = c (P 1 ,P 2 ) (S) for all S ∈ Ω X .
The DM in our model makes a choice using the following procedure. First, she uses the criterion P 1 to eliminate all inferior alternatives and get a shortlist. (Formally, she eliminates y ∈ S if and only if there exists an x ∈ S such that xP 1 y). Then she picks an alternative from the shortlist using her preference P 2 .
To facilitate discussion, the following definitions and results from Manzini and Mariotti (2007) are restated. In Manzini and Mariotti (2007) , an asymmetric binary relation on X × X is called a rationale.
Definition 2 (Manzini and Mariotti (2007))
A choice function c is a rational shortlist method (RSM) if there exist two rationales P 1 and P 2 such that c (S) = c 2 (max (S; P 1 ) ; P 2 ). The pair (P 1 , P 2 ) is said to sequentially rationalize c. Manzini and Mariotti (2007) show that a choice function c is an RSM if and only if c satisfies the following two axioms:
Weak WARP Suppose x = c x, y , and x = c (S) for some S x, y. Then for any T such that x, y ⊂ T ⊂ S, c (T) y.
While a transitive-RSM requires transitivity for both P 1 and P 2 (and completeness for P 2 ), an RSM requires transitivity for neither P 1 nor P 2 . Therefore, a transitive-RSM choice function is an RSM choice function, but not vice versa. Nevertheless, a transitive-RSM choice function permits cyclic choice behavior, as shown by the following example.
Example 1 Suppose X = x, y, z , c (X) = x, c x, y = x, c y, z = y, and c ({x, z}) = z.
Then the following pair of (P 1 , P 2 ) rationalizes the choice function c: P 1 = y, z and P 2 = (z, x) , x, y , z, y . Therefore c is a transitive-RSM choice function.
Revealed Preference
Suppose a DM in our model chooses x over y from x, y , i.e. x = c x, y . There are three possible explanations for this choice: (i) x ranks above y in her criterion P 1 and x is preferred to y according to P 2 ; (ii) x ranks above y in her criterion P 1 but y is preferred to x according to P 2 ; and (iii) x neither dominates or is dominated by y in P 1 , but x is preferred to y in P 2 .
If (i) or (ii) is the reason for x = c x, y , then the DM's shortlists from choice sets S x, y and S\ y coincide. Therefore, S and S\ y induce the same choice. On the other hand, if (iii) is the explanation for x = c x, y , then the DM's shortlists from S x, y and S\ y may be different. As a result, the choices from S and S\ y may be different. Hence, if we observe c (S) c S\ y for some S x, y, we may conclude that the alternative x is revealed as being preferred to y. The above discussion yields the following definitions. x k+1 for all k ≤ n − 1.
Definition 5
We say x 1 is indirectly revealed preferred to x n , which is denoted as x 1 c I x n , if and only if there exists {x 2 , ..., x n−1 } such that {x 1 , ..., x n } is a binary chain.
Suppose {x 1 , ..., x n , x 1 } is a binary chain. Then x 1 is indirectly revealed preferred to x 1 . 5) Our notion of the revealed preference is similar to the one in Masatlioglu et al. (2010) . They consider a choice model in which the DM is characterized by two unobservables: (i) her underlying preference, and (ii) an attention filter which reduces every choice set to a subset called a consideration set to which preferences are applied. The DM may select an alternative x in the presence of y even when the DM prefers y because y is not in the consideration set. In their framework, the underlying preference and the attention filter can be recovered if the following choice behavior is observed: c (S) = x for some S x, y but c S\ y c (S). This can happen only when her consideration set has changed, i.e., y must have been considered in S (revealed attention). Also, the fact that x is chosen while y is also in the consideration set implies that x should be revealed preferred to y (revealed preference).
In other words, some cyclic choices can only be explained by cyclic preference relations.
To minimize the departure from the standard model, we impose the following axiom. 
Main Results
Now we are ready to state our first main result:
Theorem 1 An RSM choice function c is a transitive-RSM choice function if and only if c satisfies NBCC.
Proof. In Appendix.
The "if" part of the proof to 1 is constructive. Given an RSM choice function c that satisfies NBCC, we define P 6) We think that the axiom is natural because under our interpretation, the second rationale is a strict preference relation. It is therefore reasonable to impose acyclicity on it. 7) c is sequentially rationalized by P 1 = x, y , y, z , (z, w) and P 2 = y, w , (w, x) , (z, x) .
Then, it is not difficult to see that both P Next, we discuss the identification problem of our representation. A few definitions are required. For a transitive-RSM choice function c, we denote P c 1 defined in (2.1) by P c 1 . In addition, define P (c) ≡ (P 1 , P 2 ) : c (P 1 ,P 2 ) (S) = c (S) , P i (c) ≡ P i : (P 1 , P 2 ) ∈ P (c) for some P j P i , and P 2 (P 1 ; c) ≡ {P 2 : (P 1 , P 2 ) ∈ P (c)}. . Nevertheless, both c i and c j exhibit two cycles of length 3, and one cycle of length 4.
Moreover, the cycles of length 4 by c i and c j are different.
Conclusion
The contribution of this note is twofold. First, we show that even with a standard preference, the DM in general exhibits cyclic behavior if she uses the shortlist method to make her decision. We prove that the cyclicity of indirectly revealed preference is exactly what distinguishes the RSM framework (a sequential choice model with a nonstandard preference), from the transitive-RSM framework (a sequential choice model with a standard preference) that is proposed here.
Second, we provide a partial identification result on the representation. In general, there are multiple pairs of criteria and preferences that rationalize a transitive-RSM choice function. Our partial identification result provides the tight bounds of the criterion and the preference representations, as well as the necessary and sufficient condition on the choice function for a unique criterion-preference representation.
Appendix

Proof of Theorem 1
We say that a choice function c satisfies Weak-IIA if the following condition is met.
Weak-IIA Let x, y ⊂ T ⊂ S. If x = c (S) and y = c (T), then there exists a z ∈ S\T such that c (U) = c U\ y for all U y, z. all U x, z. This contradicts c (S) = x, because x, z ∈ S.
9) Weak-IIA says the following. Suppose x and y are available in two choice sets S and T, where T ⊂ S.
In addition, suppose the DM chooses x from S, but switches to y when she faces T. Then in a sequential choice framework, a natural interpretation is that there is an alternative z which is in S but not T, and such a z leads the DM not to consider y. When the DM faces T, such a z is not present, and therefore she considers y. If this is the case, the alternative y should be irrelevant to the DM whenever z is available.
Next, we show that Weak-IIA implies Expansion. Assume that x = c (S) = c (T) but y = c (S ∪ T) x, by contradiction. Then by Weak-IIA, and x = c (S) c (S ∪ T) = y, we know that there exists a z ∈ T such that c (U) = c (U\ {x}) for all U x, z. This is a contradiction because x, z ∈ T and therefore c (T) = x c (T\ {x}).
(The "if" part) To show the "if" part, we define the following notion first. A choice function c is said to satisfy Reduction Axiom if the following property is satisfied: when x = c (S) and y = c (T) for S and T such that x, y ⊂ T ⊂ S: there exists a z ∈ S\T such that c x, y, z = x, c ({x, z}) = x, c y, z = z, and c x, y = y.
Claim 1 Weak WARP, Expansion, and NBCC together imply Reduction.
Proof. Suppose there are S and T such that x = c (S), y = c (T) and x, y ⊂ T ⊂ S. We first define the following sets: T ≡ T∪ z ∈ S : c y, z = y , S ≡ T ∪ z ∈ S : c ({x, z}) = z or c x, y, z = x .
Note that T ⊂ T ⊂ S ⊂ S by construction. Furthermore, define Z ≡ S \T and Z ≡ {z ∈ Z : c ({x, z}) = x} ⊂ Z.
We make the following observations: (i) c x, y = y and y y. Therefore, we have c x, y ∪ Z x, y for all Z ⊂ Z.
Let Z 0 = Z, and Z n+1 = Z n \ {z n }, where z n = c x, y ∪ Z n . Note that z n x, y for all n.
Then observation (iii) implies that there is a w ∈ T such that wP In addition, xP c 1 y implies c S ∪ y \ {z} = c (S\ {z}). Hence, we have c (S) = c (S\ {z}).
Next, we show that the binary relation P
